Privacy-preserving Near-neighbor search (PP-NNS) is a wellstudied problem in the literature. The overwhelming growth in the size of current datasets and the lack of any truly secure server in the online world render the existing solutions impractical either due to their high computational requirements or the non-realistic assumptions which potentially compromise privacy. PP-NNS with multiple (semi-honest) data owners having query time sub-linear in the number of users has been proposed as an open research direction in [30] . In this paper, we provide the first such algorithm which has a sub-linear query time and the ability to handle semi-honest (honest but curious) parties. Our algorithm can further manage the situation where a large chunk of the server information is being compromised.
MOTIVATION AND PROBLEM SETTING
Near-Neighbor Search (NNS) is one of the most fundamental and frequent tasks in large-scale data processing systems. The demand for privacy in big-data systems has led to an increasing interest in the problem of privacy-preserving near-neighbor search (PP-NNS).
System Goal: The scenario we are interested in is as follows: We are given a giant collection C of users (or Data Owners), each represented by some D dimensional attribute vectors, i.e., C ⊂ R D . We are interested in being able to get answers to near-neighbor queries, i.e., for a given vector q, we want to compute arg max x∈C Sim(x, q),
where Sim(., .) is a desired similarity measure. However, the process should prevent any given (possibly malicious) user from inferring the attributes of other users, except for the information that can be inferred from the answer of the NNS queries. The above setting is natural and ubiquitous in the online world where matching and recommendations are common [34] . For example, on dating websites, a user is interested in finding a match (near neighbors) without revealing their attributes to anyone who is a mismatch.
NNS cannot be entirely secure, regardless of implementation details. For example, if user i and j are very close regarding similarity (near identical), then the near-neighbor query of user i should return j as the correct answer (with high probability). A correct answer automatically reveals information that j's attributes are likely to be very similar to i's attributes (with high probability). This kind of information leak cannot be avoided by any algorithm answering the near-neighbor query with reasonable accuracy. Nevertheless, this kind of information leak is acceptable in current and connected real world. For instance, if a Twitter user Alice re-tweeted a friend Bob's tweet, all Alice's friends could know what Bob posted even though part of them were not Bob's friends. Any adversary, possessing data owner role, can query to learn extra information about its neighbors.
However, an inference of attribute information from any non-neighbor party or adversary is not acceptable. Moreover, we cannot assume any trusted server in real settings. For instance, privacy breaches where the data servers have been compromised for a significant chunk of their data are common in recent times. A famous one being the recent Yahoo's massive leak, which compromised 500 million user accounts including private information like phone number, date of birth and even answers to security questions. It is, therefore, desirable that the protocol does not rely on the complete security of participating servers and even if data from the server is compromised, the user's information should be secure.
Threat Model: There are two parties involved in our model: servers and data owners. The models in previous works, for example [30] , usually have trusted servers. In many practical scenarios, like for medical records, users do not trust server, and they do not want to share any personal information due to potential threats common in the online environment. Similar level of privacy is also desirable in the setting of personal recommendations (of friends, events, movies, etc.) especially based on neighborhood models [46] , online classification based on k-NN search, face recognition [37] , secure biometric authentication [2, 4] , privacypreserving speech recognition [33] , etc.
Keeping in mind the big-data and modern security challenges, we are interested in three main requirements: 1) We do not assume any trusted server 2) Semi-honest Data Owners (Users) and 3) The query time should be sub-linear (near constant) in the number of users (or database size), which can handle web-scale datasets. Finding sub-linear privacy preserving solution without any trusted party is currently considered to be a critical, yet open, research direction as stated in a recent article [30] . We briefly explain the three requirements: 1. Untrusted (compromisable) server: One of the common shortcomings of many existing solutions is the need of a trusted party. There have been many incidents where such trusted servers are compromised raising concerns over the validity of trusted server assumption. Thus, current users are not comfortable in sharing their sensitive information. A practical solution must therefore not involve any trusted party, i.e., all the data of the user remains with the user and should never be revealed to any cloud storage or cloud server. The users should only communicate with the server via secure mechanisms. Similar to the untrusted servers assumption in [14] , servers in our system are trusted for availability [30] . 2. Semi-honest Data Owners (Users): We assume semi-honest data owners who follow the protocols but attempt to learn query or data values of other users. Furthermore, colluding data owners in (relatively small) groups and issuing multiple queries should not affect the privacy of the protocol.
Query Time Should be Sub-linear:
With the data explosion in modern applications, scanning all the data (O(N)) for answering one query is prohibitively expensive, especially in latency-critical applications like recommendations. PP-NNS can only be deemed practical if it admits algorithms sub-linear (near constant) in the size of the database (or the number of users N ).
It should be further noted that privacy guarantees in the near-neighbor setting always rely on the inherent assumption on bounded computations. Given unbounded computations, the adversary can enumerate the whole space of every possible vector and use near-neighbor query until the generated vector returns the target user as the neighbor. In high dimensions, this process will require exponential computations due to the curse of dimensionality, which turns out to be a boon for the privacy of NNS. PP-NNS is a heavily studied problem. However, existing PP-NNS algorithms fail in one of the above three requirements. We briefly discuss some prior related works:
Secure Distance Computation Based Methods: A common philosophy in most of the modern techniques for PP-NNS is to use the very well studied topic of secure computations. Cryptographic primitives to securely compute the distances by performing the computation on encrypted version of the data [17] are commonly adopted. The security of this approach, like cryptographic tools, is based on the hardness of some problems in number theory (e.g. factorization of large numbers). Since every single bit in the computation is encrypted, distance calculations are computationally demanding and slow. Another popular approach is to use information-theoretic secure computations, which guarantees that even with unlimited computational power no adversary could compromise the data. This method is based on sharing secret information to perform the secure computations. Securely computing pairwise distances requires comparison which cannot be carried out using secretsharing alone and needs some cryptographic blocks [28, 15] which limits the overall scalability. All of these algorithms work by first computing all possible distances securely followed by finding the near-neighbors based on distance values. Irrespective of the techniques used, calculating all possible distances O(N ) is required. This line of work, thus, fails to address the sub-linear time requirement making it unscalable and impractical to modern massive datasets.
Differential Privacy(DP) and Adding Noise: There has been a successful progress of differential privacy [16, 22] . However, DP assumes a trusted server that holds all sensitive data, and the goal is to provide statistical information while preserving the privacy of user's information in the database. DP is in contrast to our security model where we do not trust the server or any party engaged in the computation. Although the security model of differential privacy is not applicable for the current setting, it might very well happen that the idea of adding noise could still be a good heuristic [27] . In this paper, we show, both theoretically and empirically, that adding noise to users attributes before communicating with the server leads to poor utility-privacy trade-offs and thereby is not a useful heuristic in this case.
Efficient Search using LSH: LSH is only one line of work which guarantees sub-linear query time approximate near-neighbor search for high dimensional datasets. LSH techniques rely on randomized binary embeddings (or representations) [36, 25, 1, 6] . These embeddings act as a probabilistic encryption which does not reveal direct information about the original attributes [25, 6] . Due to the celebrated Jonson-Lindenstrauss [26] or LSH property, it is possible to compare the generated embedding for a potential match (see Section 2 for details).
One fundamental property of LSH based binary embedding is that it preserves all pairwise distances [26] with little distortion, eliminating the need for sharing original attributes. However, the bits of these binary embeddings have enough information to estimate any pairwise distances (or similarity) [3] between any two users, which makes them unsuitable in a semi-honest setting with no trusted party. We argue that this ability to estimate all pairwise distances is sufficient but not necessary for the task of near-neighbor search. In fact, we show for the first time, that the ability to estimate distances compromises the security of LSH based embedding making them susceptible to "triangulation" attack (see Section 6.1 for details). In this work, we fix the security of LSH in the semi-honest setting without compromising its search efficiency.
Contributions of This Paper
• We propose the first algorithm for PP-NNS in semihonest users setting with query time sub-linear in the number of users. Also, we do not require any trusted party or server to handle sensitive data.
• We show a novel generic transformation which makes any given LSH scheme secure for public release, in a semi-honest setting, by preventing the estimation of all pairwise distances which is unnecessary for the task of near-neighbor search. This advantage comes at no additional cost, and we retain all the properties of LSH required for the sub-linear search. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first observation that any LSH can be made secure, in semi-honest setting, making our proposal applicable for any similarity measure which has an LSH scheme.
• We give information theoretic guarantees on the security of the proposed approach. Our proposed transformation, analysis, and the information theoretic bounds could be of independent theoretical interest.
• We provide a simple implementation of, triangulation attack, based on the method of alternating projections, for compromising the security of LSH signatures in high dimensions. The proposed attack reveals the vulnerability and unnecessary information leakage by the LSH embeddings. In general, we show that being able to estimate all pairwise distances is sufficient to recover attributes. We further provide the first thorough empirical evaluation of accuracy-privacy trade-off within triangulation attack and its comparison with noise-based privacy.
• We support our theoretical claims using substantial empirical evidence on real datasets.
BACKGROUND: LOCALITY SENSITIVE HASHING
In this section, we briefly review LSH for large-scale nearneighbor search. Please refer to [24, 25] for more specific details.
A favorite technique for approximate near-neighbor search uses the underlying theory of Locality Sensitive Hashing [24] . LSH is a family of functions, with the property that similar input objects in the domain of these functions have a higher probability of colliding in the range space than non-similar ones. In formal terms, consider H a family of hash functions mapping R D to some set S.
Definition 1 (LSH Family).
A family H is called (S0, cS0, p1, p2)-sensitive if for any two point x, y ∈ R D and h chosen uniformly from H satisfies the following:
For approximate nearest neighbor search typically, p1 > p2 and c < 1 is needed. An LSH allows us to construct data structures that give provably efficient query time algorithms for approximate near-neighbor problem with the associated similarity measure.
One sufficient condition for a hash family H to be a LSH family is that the collision probability P rH(h(x) = h(y)) is monotonically increasing function of the similarity Sim, i.e.
where f is a monotonically increasing function. In fact most of the popular known LSH family, such as MinHash (Section 2.1) and SimHash (Section 2.2), actually satisfy this stronger property. It can be noted that Equation 1 automatically guarantees the two required conditions in the Definition 1 for any S0 and c < 1. It was shown [24] that having an LSH family for a given similarity measure is sufficient for efficiently solving nearneighbor search in sub-linear time.
Popular LSH 1: Minwise Hashing and Resemblance Similarity
One of the most popular measures of similarity between web documents is resemblance (or Jaccard similarity) R [8] . This similarity measure is only defined over sets which can be equivalently thought of as binary vectors over the universe, with non-zeros indicating the elements belonging to the given set.
The resemblance similarity between two given sets x, y ⊆ Ω = {1, 2, ..., D} is defined as
where f1 = |x|, f2 = |y|, and a = |x ∩ y|. Minwise hashing [9] is the LSH for resemblance similarity. The minwise hashing family applies a random permutation π : Ω → Ω, on the given set x, and stores only the minimum value after the permutation mapping. Formally MinHash is defined as: h min π (x) = min(π(x)).
(
Given sets x and y, it can be shown by elementary probability argument that
Popular LSH 2: Signed Random Projections (SimHash) and Cosine Similarity
SimHash is another popular LSH for the cosine similarity measure, which originates from the concept of Signed Random Projections (SRP) [12, 35, 23] . Given a vector x, SRP utilizes a random w vector with each component generated from i.i.d. normal, i.e., wi ∼ N (0, 1), and only stores the sign of the projection. Formally SimHash is given by
It was shown in the seminal work [21] that collision under SRP satisfies the following equation:
where θ = cos −1
x T y ||x|| 2 ·||y|| 2 . The term
x T y ||x|| 2 ·||y|| 2 , is the cosine similarity. There is a variant of SimHash where, instead of wi ∼ N (0, 1), we choose each wi independently as either +1 or -1 with probability 1 2 . It is known that this variant performs similar to the one with w ∼ N (0, 1) [35] . Since 1 − θ π is monotonic with respect to cosine similarity S, it is a valid LSH.
Mapping LSH to 1-bit
LSH, such that MinHash, in general, generates an integer value, which is expensive from the storage perspective. It would gain a lot benefits from having a single bit hashing schemes, or binary locality sensitive bits. It is also not difficult to obtain 1-bit LSH. The idea is to apply a random universal hash function to the LSH and map it to 1-bit.
A commonly used universal scheme is given by
where a is an odd random number, see [11] for more details.
With this 1-bit mapping, any hashing output h(x) can be converted to 1-bit by applying universal 1-bit hash function h 1bit (.). Collision probability of this new transformed 1-bit hashing scheme is given by.
It is not difficult to show that h 1bit (h(x) is also a valid LSH familiy for the same similarity measure associated with h(x) [12, 38] . Another convenient (and efficient) 1-bit rehashing is to use the parity, or the most significant bit, of h min π (x) as 1-bit hash [38] .
PP-NNS in sub-linear time with a Trusted
Server.
In the trusted server settings, LSH based protocols are well-known for privacy preserving near-neighbor search [25] . The protocol with sub-linear query time search involves the following two major steps.
Hash Function Generation and Computation
(Pre-processing): The trusted server fixes random seeds for hash functions. Every user x ∈ C sends its attributes to the server. The server computes the lbit binary embedding E(x), using appropriate (prechosen) LSH schemes hi(x)s. Computing l bits involves generating multiple 1-bit hashes using independent randomization and concatenating them E(x) = [h1(x); h2(x); ...; h l (x)], where hi(x) is an independent hashing scheme drawn from the LSH family. The server also generates hash tables, as a part of preprocessing for sub-linear time search. New users can be dynamically inserted into the hash tables.
Sub-linear Searching with Hamming Distance (Query):
To find near-neighbors of any given query point q, the trusted server computes the l-bit embedding of q, E(q), using the pre-decided function E(.).
Due to the LSH property of E, it suffices to find points y ∈ C such that E(q) and E(y) are close in Hamming distance. Searching for close Hamming distance can be done very efficiently in sub-linear time [25] by only probing few buckets in the pre-constructed hash tables.
The above protocol requires a trusted server which handles all the data. The security relies on the fact that no users are allowed to see any part of the computation process. The sub-linearly of search is due to the classical sub-linear LSH algorithm for Hamming distance search [35] .
KEY NOTATIONS AND TERMS
We interchangeably use the terms users, data owners, vectors, and attributes. They all refer to the vectors in the collection C. Unless otherwise stated, the hash functions h will produce a 1-bit output, i.e., h(x) ∈ {0, 1}. All the hash functions are probabilistic, and in particular, there is an underlying family (class) of hash functions H and h is drawn uniformly from this family. The draw can be conveniently fixed using random seeds. Our protocol will require some l-bits embedding and each of these l-bits will be formed by concatenating l independent draws hi i ∈ {1, 2, ..., l} from some family of hash functions. Similarity search and the near-neighbor search will mean the same thing. Similarity and distances can be converted into each other using the formula distance = 1 -similarity. For any hash function h, the event h(x) = h(y), for given pair x and y, will be referred to as the collision of hashes.
CHALLENGES WITH COMPROMISABLE SERVER AND SEMI-HONEST USERS
For obtaining sub-linear solutions, we do not have many choices. LSH based techniques are the only known methods that guarantee efficient sub-linear query time algorithms even in high dimensions [20] . Thus, we cannot hope to deviate from the philosophy of generating a binary embedding for data vectors x, given by E(x), which preserves original near-neighbors in the obtained Hamming space.
There are two major hurdles in extending the LSH based search algorithm to the semi-honest setting without any secure server:
1. E(x) becoming public is not safe in the semihonest setting: Although, recovering x from E(x) is not possible without knowing the random seeds inside hi∀i, it is still possible to recover x from E(x) by combining a "few" calls to the function E(.) over few known inputs y i s. The LSH property allows estimation of any pairwise distances. Such estimations open room for "triangulation" attack which is hard to prevent. We explain the problem and the solution in Section 6. This information leakage with LSH is one of the major reasons why sub-linear search with semihonest users and absence of trusted party is an open research direction.
Inversion of E(x):
The theory of compressed sensing makes it possible to recover x from E(x) given the random numbers used in E. Thus, we need to ensure that neither users nor the server have complete information about the random seed and the exact computations of E(.). Every user x ∈ C, however, should be able to compute E(x) with access to a black-box function E(.). Although compressed sensing based recovery is not perfect and fully understood in our case (see Section 10.2 for discussions), it may certainly compromise with some level of privacy. Therefore, we enforce the constraints that the final random seeds in E(.) should not be known to anyone. Fortunately, this is not hard using the advances in secure multi-party computations.
It should be noted that generation of E(.) is a one-time operation which is allowed to be costlier as it does not affect the future query time.
We provide solutions to both of these problems. In particular,
• Secure LSH Embeddings: We use novel probabilistic transformations to show that converting the bits generated from LSH family into secure bits is suitable for public release in semi-honest-user model. Our solution described in Section 6.1 is secure against triangulation attack. Our secure bits preserve only the near-neighbors in the Hamming space, unlike LSH, do not allow estimation of all possible distances. Our final l-bit embedding functions will be denoted by S(x) instead of E(.) to signify the secure nature of S(.).
• Black-Box Computation of S(.): We show that, using recent cryptographic primitives, it is possible to construct secure transformed hash function S(.), such that any user x can compute S(x) but no-one knows random numbers inside the function S(.). We describe the solution in Section 8.
Our solutions for making LSH secure is also the main contributions of this paper, which makes sub-linear time PP-NNS possible in the semi-honest setting with no trusted party. In the process, we fundamentally leverage the theory of LSH from the privacy perspective.
Before we describe the technical details of our solution in Sections 6 and 8 respectively, we briefly give an overview of our final protocol.
PROPOSED PROTOCOL FOR SUB-LINEAR QUERY TIME PP-NNS SEMI-HONEST USERS WITH NO TRUSTED PARTY
The security of the final protocol is based on the proposed secure LSH (described in Section 6). With Secure LSH we can generate l-bit, for some l, embeddings S(.), such S(x) is safe for public release. Assuming that we know such embedding S(.), our final protocol for sub-linear query time PP-NNS works in the following four phases:
1. Generation of Secure Black-Box Hash Function S(.): A set of servers or users involve in secure multiparty computation to generate LSH embedding function S(.), where the final internal random numbers of S(.) is not known to anyone and is secure. Each of the bits of S(.) is generated from secure 1-bit hashing scheme, i.e., S(x) = [hsec,1(x); hsec,2(x); ...; h sec,l (x)], where hsec,i(x) is an independent secure 1-bit hashing scheme is drawn from the LSH family. The mathematical details of the function are described in Section 6 while the details on how to initialize it securely are described in Section 8 .
Black-Box Computations of Hashes:
Every user x computes his/her l-bit secure binary embedding S(x) which is sent to some public server (untrusted). This lbit signature S(x) serves as the secure public identifier for user x. S(x) only preserves the local neighborhood.
3. Construction of Hash Tables: A (non-trusted) server pre-processes the collection of l-bit binary string {S(x) :
x ∈ C} to create hash tables using the classical algorithm for sub-linear time search with Hamming distance.
Searching in Sub-linear Time (Query Phase):
To find near-neighbors of point x, it suffices to find points y such that the corresponding secure embeddings, E(x) and E(y), are near-neighbors in the Hamming distance. Searching for close Hamming distance can be done very efficiently in sub-linear time by preconstructed hash tables [35] and using the well-known algorithms.
It should be noted that other than the set SC = {S(x) : x ∈ C}, there is no information transfer between users. Hence if SC is not sufficient to recover any of the user's information, the protocol is secure.
For better readability we summarize the procedure in Algorithm 1 . 
THE KEY INGREDIENT: SECURE LSH
We explain why traditional LSH (or any scheme) which allows for estimation of any pairwise distance estimation is not secure in the semi-honest setting. We first describe the threat model followed by discussing the solution. We later formalize the privacy budget.
Semi-Honest Threat Model: "Triangulation" Attack
To give more insight into the situation, we describe triangulation attack which leads to an accurate estimation of any target user's attribute q. For illustration, we focus on two dimensions, but the arguments naturally extend in higher dimensions. Assume that we are given the LSH embedding E(q) (instead of any secure embedding S) of the target point q. An attacker, who wants to know the attributes of q, can create three random points in space A, B, C. Creating few random points is not hard, e.g. fake online profiles with ran- and E(C) with the target hash, E(q). Using these number of matches, the distances of q with A, B, and C, denoted by dA, dB and dC , can be accurately estimated from their corresponding binary embeddings, following [3] .
Estimation of Distances from LSH Embeddings: Let us focus on estimating dA from l-bit binary LSH embedding E(A) and E(q). For illustrations let l be equal to 5 and E(A) = 11010 and E(q) = 10110. Let m be the number of bit matches between E(A) and E(q) out of l. For our case, we have m = 3, because bit numbered 1,4 and 5 of E(A) and E(q) are identical. Since every bit comes from an independent 1-bit LSH scheme, we have
Thus we can estimate, in an unbiased way, the collision probability P r(h(A) = h(q)) by the expression m l of mean number of matches. With LSH, the collision probability is usually the monotonic function of the distance(or similarity) P r(h(A) = h(q)) = f (dist(A, q) where f is any monotonic function. Every monotonic function has an inverse, thus
is an accurate estimator of the distance or similarity [38, 31, 32] . See Section 10.1 for details where we describe the implementation of triangulation attack, for evaluations. After estimating the distances dA, dB and dC , the attributes of q can be inferred using triangulation. Figure 1 shows a two-dimensional illustration of our setup. Let the three different points be A, B, and C. From point A's perspective, q can be anywhere on a circle with radius dA and center A. Figure 1 shows three circles corresponding to the points A, B and C. If our estimate of distances is reasonably accurate, the intersection region of these three circles is a close estimate of the coordinates of the q.
It should be noted that even if the distance estimation is not very accurate, generating many distance estimates from different random points would be sufficient to achieve a very good accuracy in locating any target point. Thus, the LSH protocol, which reveals the distance between any pair of points, is not secure in the semi-honest setting.
The above illustration only shows two dimensions. For inferring d dimensional vectors, we need more reference points and the triangulation, so the attack seems computationally challenging. However, we show an efficient iterative process, using the idea of alternating projections [7] , to infer the attributes even in for high dimensional vectors. In Section 10.1, we describe the process in details. Our inference process shows the power of simple iterative machine learning in breaking the security, which can be of independent interest in itself. The ease of triangulation based inference of attributes further emphasizes the need for more secure hashing schemes which we propose in the next section.
Probabilistic Transformations for Generating Secure LSH
Our proposal is a generic framework for making any given LSH privacy-preserving. In particular, we prevent LSH from leaking the distance information without compromising on the accuracy of the near-neighbor search. We illustrate the main idea using 1-bit MinHash and later we formally introduce the methodology. The collision probability, for any two given data points x and y, under 1-bit MinHash is given by R(x,y)+1
(Equation 8
). This quantity varies linearly, between 1 to 0.5 as R(x, y) varies from 1 to 0, with a constant gradient of 1 2 . See Figure 2 (dotted red line). Thus, even when R(x, y) is small, the variation of the collision probability with distance keeps changing and gets reflected in the Hamming distance between the public l-bit hash string required for the near-neighbor search. This property also allows us to estimate the distances accurately by counting the number of bit matches out of the l-bits which are public. For example if 65% of bits matches then a good estimate of similarity between x and y is 0.65 × 2 − 1 = 0.3.
To make LSH privacy-preserving without losing the accuracy in near-neighbor search tasks, it is desirable to achieve the collision probability curve similar to the one given by bold blue line in Figure 2 . For this new curve, once the similarity between the pair x and y is below the satisfactory level, the collision probability becomes flat with no gradient. Thus, for any pair of random points x and y, the Hamming distance between the publicly available l-bit hash codes is around l/2 (due to the 0.5 probability of agreement), which prohibits the estimation of distances between x and y.
At this point, we have realized that we need to transform the collision probability curve so that it has the desired behavior of bold blue curve in Figure 2 . The primary challenge is to find the precise expression for the curve which has the desired behavior and at the same time represents the collision probability of some 1-bit hashing scheme. It should be noted that not every curve is a collision probability curve [12] . So it is not even known if such a mathematical expression exists. We answer this question positively. We show that the expression given by R(x,y) k +1 2 , for some large enough k, has the required "sweet" property. In particular, we construct a new 1-bit private MinHash with collision probability R(x,y) k +1 2 for any positive integer k, instead of
. The observation is that since R ≤ 1, R k for reasonably large k quickly falls to zero as R(x, y) goes away from 1, and so the quantity R(x,y) k +1 2 will be very close to 1 2 for even moderately low similarity. Furthermore, we can control the decay of the probability curve by choosing the appropriate k. The function R(x,y) k +1 2 follows the desired trend of collision probability, and secures from information theoretic perspective.
The key mathematical observation is that we can generate 1-bit hash functions with collision probability R(x,y) k +1 2 by combining k independent MinHashes. Note that, given x and y, the probability of agreement of an independent MinHash value is R(x, y). Therefore, the probability of agreement of all k independent MinHashes will be R(x, y) k , see [39] for details. Also, to generate a 1-bit hash value from k integers, we need a universal hash function that takes a vector of k MinHashes and map it uniformly to 1-bit. The final collision probability of this new 1-bit scheme will be precisely R(x,y) k +1 2 as required. The overall idea is quite general and applicable to any LSH. We formalize it in the next section.
Formalization
As argued in the previous section, we need a universal hashing scheme, huniv : N k → {0, 1}, which maps a vector of k integers uniformly to 0 or 1. There are many ways to achieve this and a common candidate is
where ri are fixed integers generated randomly.
Given a hash function h, uniformly sampled from any given locality sensitive family H, let us denote the probability of agreement (collision) of hash values of x and y under the sampling of h by Pc P collision ≡ Pc ≡ P rH(h(x) = h(y)).
Definition 2 (Secure LSH). Our proposed secure 1-bit LSH, hsec, parameterized by k, for any point x is given by
where hi, i ∈ {1, 2, ..., k} are k independent hash functions sampled uniformly from the LSH family of interest H.
It is not difficult to show the following 
-Proof: It should be noted that hsec(x) = hsec(y) can happen due to the random bit collision with probability 1 2 . Otherwise the two are equal if and only if (h1(x), h2(x), ..., h k (x)) = (h1(y), h2(y), ..., h k (y)), which happens with probability P k c , because each hi is independent and P r(hi(x) = hi(y)) = Pc. Therefore, the total probability is 1 2 + 1 2 P k c leading to the desired expression.
We illustrate the usefulness of the framework proposed above in deriving secure 1-bit hash for two most popular similarity measures: 1) Secure MinHash for Jaccard similarity and 2) Secure SimHash for Cosine similarity. The idea is applicable to any general LSH including ALSH for Maximum Inner Product Search(MIPS) [40, 43, 44 ].
Making Minwise Hashing Secure (Secure Min-Hash)
As an immediate consequence of Theorem 1, we obtain secure 1-bit MinHash for searching based on Resemblance similarity, h min sec (x) = huniv(h min π 1 (x), h min π 2 (x), ..., h min π k (x)), (13) with the following Corollary: Figure 3 shows that the nature of new collision probability follows the desired trend. The parameter k gives us the knob to tune the probability curve. In section 6.4, we discuss how to tune this knob.
To generate our final l-bit binary embedding E(x), (Section 2.4) we simply generate l independent h min sec , by using independent permutations for MinHashes and independent random numbers the universal hashing. Therefore, E(x) is the concatenation of l different h min sec . Next, we formally show that our transformed bits are more secure than LSH. In particular, we prove that the mutual information between the two secure 1-bit MinHashes, h min sec (x) and h min sec (y) decays sharply (exponentially) to zero as the similarity between x and y (i.e. R) goes away from 1. Thus, there is negligible mutual information about x in the embedding of some random (non-neighbor) y.
Information Theoretic Bound as a function of
k Theorem 2. For any two data points x and y, with R being the Jaccard Similarity between them, the mutual information between h min sec (x) and h min sec (y) is bounded by
As can be seen from Equation 15 , the mutual information drops rapidly (exponentially with k) to zero for x and y with small similarity. Thus, for any two non-neighbor points (small R) the generated bits behave like random bits revealing no information about each other. Obviously, k = 1, which is the usual choice for MinHash, is not very secure, as the bits contain significant mutual information. The choice of k controls the decay of the mutual information with similarity thresholds and hence is the privacy knob (see Section 6.4 for details on how to tune this knob). 
Making Signed Random Projections Secure (Secure SimHash)
Analogous to MinHash, we can make SimHash secure with the same properties. (16) where wi for all i are independently chosen. Figure 3 (right) summarizes the collision probability as a function of similarity for different k. 
Formalism of Privacy Budget
Suppose, the application considers any pair of point x, y with Sim(x, y) < s0 as non-neighbors, for some problemdependent choice of s0. The application also specifies an such that the collision probability of any two non-neighbors should not exceed 1 2 + (be very close to half (random)). Forcing this condition ensures that whenever Sim(x, y) < s0, the released bits cannot distinguish x and y with any randomly chosen pair. Formally, Definition 3 ( Secure Hashing at Threshold s0). We call a 1-bit hashing scheme hsec secure at threshold s0 if the probability of bit matches satisfies:
For any x and y with Sim(x, y) ≤ s0 , we have 1 2 ≤ P r(hsec(x) = hsec(y)) ≤ 1 2 + ,
We show that for any epsilon secure hash function the mutual information in the bits of non-neighbor pairs is small. Theorem 3 (Information bound:). For any 1-bit secure hash function at threshold s0, the mutual information between h(x) and h(y), for any pair with Sim(x, y) ≤ s0, is bounded as
Next, we show that Secure LSH can always be made secure hash function for any using appropriate choice of k. 
where is the ceiling operation. Here h(x) is the original hash function from which the hsec is derived.
Proof: Follows from the definition of secure hashing combined with fact that h(x) is an LSH and satisfy Definition 1.
For obtaining secure MinHash we need k = log 2 log s 0 . For secure SimHash, we need to choose k = log 2
To get a sense of quantification, if we consider s0 = 0.75 (high similarity) and = 0.05, then for MinHash we have k = 8 and SimHash we have k = 12.
NOISE ADDITION METHODS AND ITS POOR UTILITY-PRIVACY TRADEOFF
Obfuscating information by adding noise is some of the most popular techniques for achieving privacy. By adding sufficient noise to the hashes, we can construct secure scheme satisfying Definition 3 . However, any fixed protocol for noise addition will obfuscate the information in every bit uniformly, which will affect the utility of near-neighbor search significantly. We elaborate this poor utility-privacy trade-off with noise addition techniques. This is not the first time when such poor utility-privacy trade-off is being observed with noise addition [19] . Note, the results are very specific to the current problem where we want secure embeddings for sub-linear search.
Following popular noise addition mechanism [27] , in order to achieve the Definition 3, we can choose to corrupt 1-bit LSH h(x) with a random bit, with probability f . Formally, the generated hash function is hcorr(x) = randombit, with probability f h(x) with probability 1-f .
Theorem 5. The new collision probability after this corruption, for any two x and y, is given by:
Proof: With probability f we get a random bit which has collision probability 1 2 . With remaining (1 − f ) probability we use h 1bit with collision probability P r(h 1bit (x) = h 1bit (y)) Let us define P (s) = P r(h 1bit (x) = h 1bit (y)|Sim(x, y) = s). Using this quantity, we have the following. Theorem 6. hcorr is secure at threshold s0, iff
Proof: Immediate after substitution combined with the fact that h 1bit is also a valid LSH scheme.
For 1-bit MinHash with corruption the collision probability boils down to R(1−f )+1
2
. Thus f only changes the slope of collision probability curve. Figure 4 shows the variations of collision probability with noise. To ensure secure hash at similarity s0 threshold, we must have
To understand its implication, consider, an example with s0 = 0.75 (high similarity) and = 0.05. This combination requires f ≥ 0.86. Such high f implies that most bits 86% are randomly chosen, and hence they are uninformative. Even for very similar (almost identical) x and y, the collision probability is close to random. This loses the usefulness of LSH scheme significantly. Ideally, we want high (much larger than 0.5) collision probability for near-neighbor search and random 0.5 probability for non near-neighbors pairs to ensure privacy. Corrupting hash bits for privacy is therefore not a good idea due to poor utility-privacy trade-off. In contrast, for the same threshold s0 = 0.75 and same epsilon = 0.05, secure LSH needs k = 8 which leads to the collision probability expression R 8 +1
. For x = y, i.e. R = 1, this expression is always 1. For x and y with similarity 0.95 the collision probability is greater than 0.83, significantly higher than 0.56 obtained using noise addition which is very close to the random probability 0.5.
HIDING THE MECHANISM OF S(.)
We are now ready to describe the final piece of our protocol. We describe in detail how we can reasonably hide the Figure 3 for secure MinHash random seeds inside of S(.) from everyone. To compute the hash of the user's input, we need random seeds (e.g., for MinHash, random seeds are the random permutations and for SimHash, they are random vectors used in the projection step). Since these random seeds should be equal for all users, we cannot let each user generate her seeds. Seeds should be chosen consistently.
If the server generates the seeds, then we have two options: (i) for each new user that has query, we send the actual seeds to her so that she can compute the hash of her input. In this case the true random seeds are revealed in plaintext to every user. (ii) We engage in a two-party secure function evaluation protocol in which both seeds and user's input will remain private and at the end the hash value is computed. In both cases, the user's input is not revealed to the server but the server still knows the seeds and also gets the hash value and therefore our system would require trusting the server. There are several studies [19] which show that the server can extract information about user's input by having the seeds and the hash. As a result, we need to design a mechanism such that no party knows the seeds, which is an important and yet difficult task.
To compute E(x) securely without revealing the actual random seeds to any party, we need to deploy at least two different servers. While we do not trust either server, we require that two servers should not collude (two servers can be represented by two different companies such as Google and Microsoft).
In the initial phase, each server generates its own version of seeds randomly. Whenever a user wants to compute a secure hash (E(x)), she generates a random D dimensional vector v (same dimensionality as her input value) and then XORs this vector with x (resulting in x ⊕ v). She then sends v to server #1 and x⊕v to server #2. Given this information and the two initial random seeds, then both servers engage in a two-party secure computation. Here, we utilize Garbled Circuit (GC) protocol in order to compute E(x).
GC protocol is one of the generic secure function evaluation protocols that allows two parties to jointly compute a function on their inputs while keeping each input private to their owners. In this protocol, the function that needs to be evaluated securely, has to be described as a Boolean circuit. The computation and communicaiton complexity of this algorithm is proportional to the number of non-XOR gates in the circuit. The global flow of our approach is illustrated in Figure 5 . Server #1 inputs v and server #2 inputs x ⊕ v to the GC protocol. In addition, each server puts his random seeds as an input to the GC protocol. Actual seeds used for generating the hash of x are based on the two random seeds from two servers and are generated in the Boolean circuit that is used inside the GC protocol. In our case, the Boolean circuit is the secure hash computation suggested in Section 6. For example, for securely outsourcing the computation of secure MinHash, we have designed the Boolean circuit in Section 8.1. After two servers run the GC protocol, they both acquire secret shared value of the hash (E1(x) and E2(x)) and one of them needs to XOR the two values to get the real hash. RNG stands for Random Number Generator. The security proof of our proposed approach is given in Theorem 7.
Here, we have summarized the steps that user needs to do. Please consider that this approach requires the user to only generate a random bit string and one XOR operation which are very inexpensive operations. Furthermore, there are recent advances which makes hashing algorithmically faster [41, 42] .
1. Generate a random mask v.
3. Send v to server #1 and x ⊕ v to server #2. Proof: The security proof of our scheme has two parts: (i) we need to prove that each server cannot infer any information about the actual user's input. (ii) No information about the final random seeds (that are used to compute hash value) are revealed to any server.
First, (i) is true because server #1 gets the random value v which is totally independent of x and is generated randomly. Server #2 has received x ⊕ v which is identical to the definition of One-Time Pad (OTP) encryption and is proven to be secure. This is because server #2 doesn't have the encryption pad (v) and only receives x ⊕ v. Please note that XORing the two secret shared values that are held by two servers (v and x⊕v), yields the user's input (v⊕(x⊕v) = x). But by the assumption of the non-colluding servers, this can never happen.
Second, (ii) is true because GC protocol is a secure function evaluation protocol and by definition, at the end of the protocol none of the parties has any information about the input from the other party. Hence, server #1 inputs his random seeds together with v and server #2 inputs her random seeds together with x ⊕ v. All other computations are done using GC protocol and hence are secure. The final random seeds are generated by XORing the two random seeds from the servers inside the GC protocol and as a result, no one has access to its value.
Circuit for Secure MinHash
As we discussed earlier, we need to design a Boolean circuit of the function that we want to evaluate securely. Here, we describe the circuit for computing secure MinHash. Figure 6 shows the block diagram of the circuit. The circuit is designed based on the definition of secure MinHash. Our goal is to minimize the number of non-XOR gates due to the free-XOR technique of [29] . This technique makes the use of XOR gates almost free and hence the dominant cost metric is the number of non-XOR gates.
Inputs. Each server puts her input as described bellow:
• Server #1: Binary vector v of length D that has been received from the client. Randomly generated Seedi #1 and ri where i = 1, 2, ..k.
• Server #2: Binary vector x ⊕ v of length D that has been received from the client. Randomly generated Seedi #2 and r i where i = 1, 2, ..k.
Output. 1-bit secure MinHash.
Here, we explain how the circuit works. First, v and x ⊕ v are XORed to produce the real user's input (x) inside the circuit. Then the two permutation seeds from two servers are used to permute the user's input. The final permutation is not revealed to either server since it is the combination of both permutations. The first seed together with x is given to Waksman shuffling network [47] . We have used this network to efficiently compute the random permutation with minimum number of non-XOR gates. The Waksman shuffling network is based on 2 input swapping blocks with 1-bit selection signal. To get the minimum number of non-XOR gates in the circuit, we have designed this block to have only 1 AND gate. Figure 7 shows the circuit for swapping block. The swap signal is s, two inputs to the swap block are a and b, and two outputs are a and b . When s = 0, a = a and b = b and when s = 1, a = b and b = a. The number of swap blocks that are needed to implement the network is F (N ) = N log2N − N + 1 where N is the number of elements that are going to be shuffled (permuted). In our case, N = D.
As the next step, we input the permuted user's input to the second Waksman network with the permutation seeds from the second server. The final permuted binary vector is then given to the priority encoder to find the index of the first non-zero element. Please note that from this point forward, the bit-length of wires are changed to log 2 D (because the index of the first non-zero element of D-bit binary vector can be described with log 2 D bits). At this point, we have computed a regular MinHash of client's input. Now, by the definition of secure MinHash, we need to multiply the hash with a random coefficient. Again, this coefficient is computed as the XOR of two random coefficients from two servers. The same procedure happens k times, and the result of each step is added to the previous ones. In the end, we need to compute modp operation. This operation is implemented as loops of subtraction to find the residue. mod2 is just outputting the Least Significant Bit (LSB) of the previous step. In the end, we acquire 1-bit secure MinHash. We need to run this circuit l times to produce l-bit secure MinHash.
Concrete Circuit Cost. We analyze the number of non-XOR gates in the circuit concretely and give a mathematical cost function based on our aforementioned parameters. Table 1 summarizes the costs.
Every operation in Table 1 has to be done for k times except for mod p (one time) and Waksman network (2 × k times). Therefore, the total cost (number of non-XOR gates) is given by the following formula:
Please note that we need to run the circuit for l times. Therefore, the total number of non-XOR gates in the GC protocol would be l times the total number of non-XOR gates in depicted circuit. Substituting l = 32, k = 8, and D = 1024 (2 10 ), the total number of non-XOR gates is 6.58M. Using state-of-the-art GC frameworks such as Tiny-Garble [45] , the end-to-end secure hash computation takes almost 1 second to finish.
EVALUATIONS

Utility-Privacy Tradeoff
In this section, we provide thorough evaluations of the accuracy and privacy trade-off in our framework. Our aim is two-fold: 1) We want to evaluate the benefits of our proposal compared to traditional LSH in preventing triangulation attack and simultaneously evaluate the effect of our proposal on the utility of near-neighbor search. 2) We also want to understand the utility-privacy of noise addition techniques in practice and further quantify it with the trade-offs of our approach. It is important to have such evaluations, as pure noise addition may be a good heuristic on real datasets that prevents the triangulation attack without hurting accuracy.
Datasets: We use the IWPC [13] and Speed-Dating datasets [18] . They belong to different domains, and both contain private and sensitive attributes of the concerned individual. The IWPC is a medical dataset which consists of 186 demographic, phenotypic and genotypic features like race, medicines taken and Cyp2C9 genotypes of 5700 patients. We split the records to 80% for creating hash tables and 20% for querying. The dataset is publicly available for research purposes. The type of data contained in the IWPC dataset is equivalent to that of other private medical datasets that have not been released publicly [19] . Speed-Dating dataset has 8378 text survey samples, each has 186 features representing geometric features or answers to designed questions for the volunteered subjects.
We focus on the cosine similarity search, and therefore our underlying LSH scheme is SimHash (or Signed Random Projections). The gold standard neighbors for every query were chosen to be the points with cosine similarity greater than or equal to 0.95. Note, LSH is threshold-based [24] and hence we chose a reasonable high similarity threshold.
Baselines: We chose the following three baselines for our comparisons. 1. LSH: This is the standard SimHash based embedding. 2. Secure LSH: As described in Section 6, we use our proposed transformation to make LSH secure. To study the utility-privacy trade-off we varied the privacy parameter k on the accuracy. We evaluate all k = 2, 4, 6, 8, 12. Note, k = 1 is vanilla SimHash. 3. Noise-based LSH: [27] shows a way to release user information in a privacy-preserving way for near-neighbor search. The paper showed that adding Gaussian noise N (0, σ 2 ) after the random projection preserves differential privacy. To compute the private variant of SimHash (Signed random projection), we used the sign of the differentially random private vector (generated by perturbed random projections) as suggested in [27] . To understand the trade-off we varied the noise levels over a fine grid σ = 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1.0, 1.5, 2.0.
We generated 32 hash bits for IWPC and 64 hash bits for Speed-Dating using each of the different competing candidate hashing scheme. For each query data, we ranked points in training data based on Hamming distance of the competing hash codes. We then computed the precision and recall of the Hamming based ranking on the gold standard neighbors. We summarized the complete precision-recall curves for both the datasets and all the competing scheme in Figure 8 . This is a standard evaluation for hashing algorithms in the literature [48] . Higher precision-recall under a given ranking indicates a better correlation of binary Hamming distance with the actual similarity measure. A better correlation directly translates into a faster algorithm for sub-linear near neighbor search [35] with Hamming distance.
In Figure 8 left plots show the retrieval precision and recall curve using various σ in Noise-LSH. The Vanilla LSH line, which is the performance of LSH k = 0 or σ = 0 serves as the reference in the plots. With increasing σ, the accuracy of noise based hashing drops dramatically. Adding noise as argued in Section 7 leads to poor collision probability for similar neighbors which in turn leads to a significant drop in accuracy compared to LSH as evident from the plots. As the privacy budget is increased, by adding more noise, the performance drops significantly. In contrast, the right plots show the precision and recall curve using different ks with Secure SimHash. When increasing privacy budget k, the accuracy does not drop and even gets better than vanilla LSH. This improvement is not surprising and can be attributed to the enhanced gap between the collision probability of nearneighbor and any random pairs (Figure 3 ). It is known that with hashing based techniques such enhanced gap leads to better accuracy [24] . The plots show a consistent trend across the datasets and clearly signify the superiority of our proposed transformation over both LSH and noise addition based methods in terms of retrieving near-neighbors. The result clearly establishes the importance of studying problem specific privacy before resorting to obfuscation based on noise.
Effectiveness against Triangulation Attack
In the previous section, we show that irrespective of the privacy budget, our proposal is significantly more accurate than LSH and noise addition. Our theoretical results suggest that the proposal is also secure against triangulation attack, whereas vanilla LSH is not. We validate this claim in this section. Furthermore, we also study the effectiveness of noise addition in preventing the attack.
To evaluate the privacy, we implemented the "triangulation attack" and inferred its accuracy on real dataset, IWPC, and Speed-Dating. The task was to infer sensitive attributes of a given target query vector by triangulating it with respect to randomly chosen points as explained in Section 6.1. For IWPC, we selected some sensitive attributes for inference like cancer or not, set of medicines taken or Cyp2C9 genotypes to form the attack data points. And for Speed-Dating, we randomly chose the attributes for inferring. To scale-up the implementation for higher dimensions, we used novel iterative projection algorithm which successively approaches the target. The setting and the procedure was described separately in Section 10.1, which could be of separate interest.
We used the same privacy budget, i.e., k = 1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 12 for Secure SimHash and σ = 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1.0, 1.5, 2.0, for noise based SimHash. Again, k = 1 and σ = 0 corresponded to the vanilla LSH method which will serve as our reference point. We computed the error of the estimated target using triangulation attack with the actual target. We then calculated the mean and standard deviations of the errors over 100 independent triangulation attacks. The errors for varying k for our proposed secure LSH and varying σ for noise based LSH were summarized in Figure 9 . We also plotted the accuracy of random guess which will serve as our holy grail for privacy. The attack accuracy for K = 1 (σ = 0) is substantially better than random clearly indicating the vanilla LSH is not secure. The decrease in attack accuracy with an increase in k clearly shows the high security level of (Higher is better). The dotted red line is the vanilla LSH. We can clearly see that adding noise loses utility while the proposed approach is significantly better.
the proposed LSH. As indicated by our theoretical results, the accuracy of the triangulation attack decreases and slowly approaches the random level as the privacy budget increases. We can conclude that both noise addition and our proposal effectively prevents triangulation attack. Increasing noise, as expected, preserves privacy but at a significant loss in utility. However, the retrieval experiments show that our proposal provides privacy without loss in accuracy. For all σ, there always exists some k which could achieve significantly better performance for the same level of security.
DISCUSSIONS
Alternating Projections for Triangulation Attack
We provide the details of our implementation of the triangulation attack over SimHash with cosine similarity (angles) as the measure. We start with all normalized vectors. Given the target point q, we generate D random points Xis in the space.
q ∈ R D , Xi ∈ R D , i = {1, 2...D}, Xi 2 = q 2 = 1 (26) Then we estimate the distance between every Xi and q, di = Xi − q 2, ∀i = {1, 2..D} (27) We estimate the distance as described in Section 6.1, first we estimate the angle θ using hashes H(Xi), H(q). P r(H(Xi) = H(q) = (1 − θ π ) + 1 2 (28) θ = π(2 − 2P r(H(Xi) = H(q))) (29)
Then we can get the distance di, by
because Xi, q are all unit vectors. After getting all the distances, we use Alternating Projection Methods 1 to find the possible intersection of D + 1 D-spheres, S1...SD, each with central point Xi and radius Xi − q 2. Any point in the intersection will be likely to be very close to the target point. The algorithm for computing the point in the intersection is summarized in Figure 2 . We starts with an arbitrary value for i0 and then generates the sequence of projections i k+1 = PS N PS N −1 (...PS 1 (i k )) , here PS i (i k ) denotes the projection of point i k on sphere Si.
Assumptions and Compressed Sensing Lower Bounds
Our protocol requires an assumption that multiple parties involved in the generating of S(.) do not collude. In this section, we present some discussion on why this requirement is not critical and even with complete knowledge of S(.) our protocol maybe secure.
However, in a rare scenario, even if the parties collude and the function S(.) is compromised, it is significantly hard to invert S(x). Revealing the exact mechanism of S(.) poses a threat of possible inversion of the function S(x) to obtain x using Compresses Sensing. Note that there is a loss of information from x to S(x), due to heavy quantization and mod operations. Following are the two main reasons why such an inversion is hard even with complete knowledge of S(.):
1. Compresses Sensing Inference is Similar to Triangulation: The algorithms for compressed sensing are only known for LSH style signed measurements. Compresses sensing from our proposed secure LSH is not known, and we suspect it might be significantly difficult. Current compressed sensing algorithm work by iteratively reducing the possible space of the x, given S(.), by introducing constraints about some known point [5] . This procedure is very similar to triangulation attack. Thus, if triangulation attack does not work, it is unlikely that there will be an efficient compressed sensing algorithms. Compressed sensing attack for our Secure LSH is a topic for future work which could be of independent interest.
Compressed Sensing Lower Bounds:
Compressed sensing requires at least O(s log D) measurements for reasonable accuracy [10] , where s is the number of nonzeros in the data vector and D is the dimensions. Also, the big-O has large hidden constants. Thus for high dimensional vectors with significant non-zeros, the number of bits in S(.) is likely to be smaller than O(s log D) making it automatically secure against any possible attack, because compresses sensing lower bounds are generic to any linear measurements [10] . Note that we only need few (constant number of) bit measurements to identify neighbors/non-neighbors in the hamming distance. The number of bits required is independent of dimensions and only depend on similarity levels.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper addresses the important problem of privacypreserving near-neighbor search for multiple data owners having query time sub-linear in the number of users. We show that the generic method of Locally Sensitive Hashing (LSH) for sub-linear query search is vulnerable to a triangulation attack. To secure LSH, a novel transformation is suggested based on secure probabilistic embedding over appropriate LSH family. We theoretically demonstrate that our transforms preserve the near-neighbor embedding of LSH while they make distance estimation infeasible. By combining our transforms with Yao's Garbled Circuit protocol, we devise the first practical privacy-preserving near-neighbor algorithm that is scalable to the massive dataset without strong assumptions on the behavior of users or a trusted party. The paper provides substantial empirical evidence on real data from medical records of patients and online dating users to support its theoretical claims.
